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Thank you very much, Michael. And thanks to you and everyone
at the Cox Center for organizing this conference and inviting me to
speak. The title of my lecture derives from my book Power and
Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11. 1 Today I will
talk about the themes of the book as they apply to the topic of this
conference.
The title of this conference invites the question: What’s at stake
in this election for presidential power and foreign affairs and national
security law? My basic answer is that relatively little is at stake. This
is not a claim about whether our policy toward Israel or Iran or China
will change. I’m not an expert in those fields, and I believe such
things are hard to predict in any event. Rather, I‘m going to focus on
what might be called “legal policy” topics related to presidential
power, national security law and foreign relations law. My claim is
that legal policy in these areas will continue on the same basic track
of the last few years regardless of who is elected president.
This prediction is not based on an analysis of campaign speeches
or party platforms. The 2012 Republican platform said hardly
anything about national security legal policy issues. But even if it did,
I don’t think it would mean much for a possible Romney presidency.
If you think I am wrong, if you believe that platforms matter, and if
you are inclined to think there will be a big difference between a
President Obama and a President Romney on the issues before us, I
invite you to think back to how much President Obama promised he
would change President Bush’s policies during the presidential
campaign of 2008. 2
In fact, as we all know now, despite these pledges, and contrary
to expectations, President Obama was much more aggressive than
expected in asserting presidential powers. 3 In many contexts, he
continued late Bush-era policies (such as state secrets, surveillance,
military detention). In other contexts, he continued but accelerated
*
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trends that prevailed in the late Bush Administration. Consider three
examples of the latter phenomenon. First, the Obama Administration
ended the CIA interrogation and black site program. But that
program was dying and practically non-operational during the last
two years of the Bush Administration. 4 Second, Obama ramped up
targeted killings once in office, but he was actually continuing a trend
of ramped-up targeted killings during the last two years of the Bush
Administration. 5 Finally, President Obama worked with Congress to
tighten the rules for military commissions, but those changes were
relatively small and continued a trend that had begun in 2002. 6
Understanding the structural factors that led President Obama to
continue President Bush’s policies in these ways is the key to
understanding why our basic national security legal policies will
persist beyond the next election regardless of who is president.
Obviously, if President Obama wins the election, he can be expected
to pursue the same basic policies that he followed during the first four
years. The more interesting claim is that if Romney wins the election,
he won’t change Obama’s policies much. So what are the structural
factors that led Obama to follow Bush and that would lead Romney,
if he wins, to follow Obama?
First, and most obvious, is the responsibility of the presidency. It
is a truism that governing is much more difficult than campaigning.
The occupant of the Oval Office has undelegable responsibilities for
the security of the nation (and in many respects for the security of
the world). Every president knows that he is invariably responsible for
national security catastrophes. This responsibility focuses every
president’s attention, and causes him to be risk averse about national
security and to spend an inordinate amount of time and energy
protecting national security.
Second and relatedly, when the president enters the Oval Office,
he gets access to national security information that the public cannot
see. The president knows a lot more about what’s going on than the
public does and what the president sees is a lot scarier than what the
public sees. The threat looks much greater from the inside than it
does from the outside. This asymmetric insider information leads
every president to act relatively aggressively to protect national
security.
Third, every president assumes the perspective of the executive
branch and inherits the practices and precedents that have defined
the institution for over two centuries. No president is going to simply
discard those practices and precedents, including the practices and
precedents that support the exercise of presidential power—especially
4.

See id. at 16, 19.
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since, as just mentioned, the president has these enormous
responsibilities to keep us safe. As we learned when Barack Obama
came to office, presidents won’t renounce basic presidential powers
and tools that are available and that can be deployed to keep the
country safe.
The fourth factor that undergirds continuity in national security
legal policies across administrations is the national security
bureaucracy. When a new administration comes in there is turnover
at the surface of this bureaucracy. But just below the surface, one
finds most of the same people from the previous administration,
addressing exactly the same problems, collecting the same
information, analyzing that information, and sending it to the new
president. President Obama was unusual in keeping many of his
predecessor’s top national security officials, including his Defense
Secretary (Robert Gates), his FBI Director (Bob Mueller), and his
head of the National Counterterrorism Center (Michael Leiter). And
even when there was change at the top, such as when Leon Panetta
became Director of the CIA, there was continuity just below.
Panetta’s top Deputy at the CIA was Stephen Kappes, a long time
CIA official who had significant responsibilities for the controversial
CIA black site and interrogation program; and his general counsel for
his first year was John Rizzo, the thirty-five-year veteran of the CIA
who was the acting general counsel of the CIA for most of the Bush
years and intimately involved in its controversial programs. 7 I don’t
mention the persistence of bureaucratic outlook to tell a nefarious
story about the unelected bureaucracy running the country. The point
is simply that national security problems are worked on across many
administrations by professionals who continue to work on them when
a new administration comes in, and inevitably the president’s
information and advice and range of options are formed and to some
degree bounded by what these professionals tell him.
Fifth, and finally, I come to the largest and most important force
that led to continuity—constitutional checks and balances. A central
theme of my book, Power and Constraint, is that the main reason
Obama continued the trends and policies of the Bush Administration
was that the Bush policies as they stood in January 2009 had been
dramatically changed over the previous five years. The Bush policies
had changed in just about every area of counterterrorism policy,
including military commissions, military detentions, surveillance,
black sites, interrogation, habeas corpus, and the like. In all of these
areas, Bush’s powers narrowed, in some contexts significantly. Why
did this happen? Because, contrary to conventional wisdom, our
constitutional checks and balances had worked remarkably well.

7.

See id. at 27–28.
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The courts engaged the president during wartime like never before
and issued decisions that narrowed presidential power in
unprecedented ways. This was true in the Hamdi case in 2004, which
recognized due process rights for enemy soldiers for the first time. 8 It
was true in the Hamdan case in 2006, which not only struck down the
president’s military commissions, but also recognized, without giving
any deference to the president’s contrary interpretive view, that
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention governed in the war
with al-Qaeda. 9 That rule had profound implications inside the
executive branch. 10 And finally in 2008 in Boumediene, the Court held
that the writ of habeas corpus as a matter of constitutional law
extended to Guantanamo and that the detainees at Guantanamo had
a right to pursue habeas corpus release in courts in the United
States. 11 All those rulings had the effect, in combination with other
factors, of changing Bush’s policies, of moderating Bush’s policies, in
many respects, of narrowing presidential power. They also had the
effect (in combination with other acts, discussed below), of enhancing
the legitimacy of these presidential practices.
In addition to courts, and again contrary to popular opinion,
Congress was deeply involved in pushing back against the presidency.
This happened most significantly in 2005 when it enacted the
Detainee Treatment Act, which closed a loophole in interrogation
law. 12 Despite the famous Bush signing statement, the Detainee
Treatment Act stopped the CIA’s interrogation program in its
tracks. 13 Congress also had a big impact in narrowing and
constraining the president in the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 14
Congress, in 2008, did give President Bush, at his lowest point of his
presidency, large surveillance powers in the FISA Amendments Act.15
8.

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (“[A] court that
receives a petition for a writ of habeas corpus from an alleged enemy
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But they did so with an unprecedented array of internal checks and
balances that, in my opinion, significantly improved the legitimacy
and the efficacy of surveillance in the United States.
These changes by the Court and Congress were supported by and
in some senses made possible by other powerful forces at work. The
press was much more aggressive in reporting government national
secrets than ever before. 16 Many of the published reports about secret
national security activities inside the Bush Administration led to
reforms in Congress and the Supreme Court. 17 In addition, nongovernmental organizations were very powerful, both in litigating
claims that led to some of these landmark decisions, and in criticizing
the Administration, extracting information, and leading campaigns. 18
The forces that pushed back against Bush also pushed back
against Obama, though from the other direction. When Obama tried
to close GTMO and to conduct criminal trials of GTMO detainees,
Congress pushed back hard through legislation and effectively stopped
the president from doing so. 19 So the supposedly feckless Congress
that moved Bush to the center from where he was on interrogation,
black sites, and military commissions also forced Obama toward the
center when he tried to change national security policy in a way that
Congress did not approve.
These are the larger forces that explain continuity between the
Bush and Obama eras, and that I think will lead to continuity no
matter who is elected president in 2012. The fact is that most big
issues of national security law and policy today are settled and
legitimated by our constitutional system. There is a remarkable
consensus in the country today about the scope of counterterrorism
policies—a consensus reflected in Congress, in the courts, and in a
White House occupied by the first two post-9/11 presidents.
Regardless of who is president, this consensus won’t change much
unless there is some large external shock to the system like another
attack or some other dramatic external event.
I now want to turn to under-appreciated structural considerations
that affect the presidency and that I do think could affect change in
counterterrorism policies. Not all structural considerations lead to
continuity. There are some that lead to difference, and I want to close
by talking about one.
What the public and Congress and courts think about the
president’s beliefs and dispositions, and how much they trust the
president on certain issues, informs the effective scope of presidential
16.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 51–82.

17.

Id. at 67–68.

18.
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19.

See id. at 44–48.
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power on national security issues. Since George W. Bush had the
reputation of being a cowboy of sorts, and when he took aggressive
counterterrorism actions, many worried, with reason, that he might
not be adequately controlled. But one heard very few complaints
George Bush was engaged in what we might call softer
counterterrorism tactics, like trying criminals in civilian courts, which
he did all the time. Similarly, few complained when Bush released
hundreds of detainees from GTMO. Very few people complained
about these policies because—and I‘m generalizing here, but it is a
fair generalization, I think—the Democrats liked the policy and the
Republicans liked the president. That’s too simple, of course, because
on some issues (like interrogation) bipartisan majorities pushed back
against President Bush. But as a basic slogan to capture a complex
but real phenomenon, I think it works.
The same thing happened in mirror image with Barack Obama.
He came to office as a former constitutional law professor committed
to civil rights. When he took “soft” initiatives like trying to close
GTMO or to have civilian criminal trials for GTMO detainees,
Republicans and Democrats in Congress pushed back. Some of this is
politics of course, but some of it is insufficient trust of the president
on such issues. On the other hand, Obama has gotten much more of a
free ride than Bush did when he does aggressive things. For example,
I think that the significant ramping up of the drone program, if it had
happened under a Republican administration, would have been
received much more harshly by Congress than it has been under
Obama. For drones, Republicans like the policy and Democrats like
the president.
So, what are the implications of this point for the next election? If
Obama continues in office then that same dynamic will play out. If
Romney wins the presidency, we’ll go back, I think, to something like
the Bush dynamic. I think Romney will have more leeway for
releasing people from GTMO and having civilian criminal trials, but
less leeway on drones and enhanced interrogation.
This leads to my final point. One of the issues that I think is not
completely resolved and is going to be an issue for the next president
is the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and its
increasing antiquation. The AUMF was, as most of you know, enacted
in September 2001. It is the basic legal grounding for most of the
things the president is doing in the “war on terror.” The AUMF
authorized the president to use all necessary and appropriate force
against states, persons and organizations who were responsible for
9/11. It has been interpreted by presidents to include not only alQaeda and Taliban, but associated forces of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, not just in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but around the world
including Yemen and Somalia and elsewhere. The problem is that the
terror threat is moving away from al-Qaeda and its affiliates and is
moving towards what I call extra-AUMF threats, which are

16

CaseWestern Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012
Power and Constraint

threatening groups that lack any affiliation with al-Qaeda. 20 The
problem for the executive branch is that the AUMF is increasingly
unhelpful to the president in meeting developing threats. There’s a
growing gap between the threat and what the AUMF authorizes the
president to do. 21
I think that as a result of this trend, there is going to be a push
for a new AUMF in the next four years. And here’s a non-disprovable
prediction: If Barack Obama is President, he will garner a much more
pro-presidential power AUMF than if Romney is elected, because he
would be more trusted in the exercise of aggressive presidential
powers (just as he receives more trust than a Republican would on
drones). The upshot of this prediction is that if you’re worried about
a new and expanded AUMF and you want to cabin it as much as
possible, you should vote for Mitt Romney.
Thank you very much.
PROF. SCHARF: Jack has graciously offered to entertain your
questions for 15 minutes. We have two microphones up here. I need
you to come down and line up. Please state your name and your
affiliation and ask a question and keep it short, because that way
many other people can join in. If you’re up in the overflow room, and
I know there’s about sixty people up there, please, also come down
during this period and ask your questions. So, we’ll start with
Professor Shabalala.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 1: Good morning. It’s a real pleasure to have you.
My name is Dalindyboe Shabalala. I’m a visiting professor here. I
teach at Maastricht University in the Netherlands. A question about
how you draw the line between discretion and legality. On some of
these issues, I know for example with respect to the CIA decision not
to continue the interrogation program, 22 it strikes me that with the
signing statement, what we see is that as an act of policy and
discretion rather than admitting on the part of the establishment
there is an actual legal barrier there. So it’s an exercise of discretion,
and I wonder whether you think that exercise in discretion has been—
is coextensive with our concept of the legality of the actions?

20.

See Jack Goldsmith, The Growing Problem of Extra-AUMF Threats,
LAWFARE (Sept. 30, 2010, 11:53 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2010/09/the-growing-problem-of-extra-aumf-threats/.

21.

See generally Robert Chesney, Beyond the Battlefield, Beyond Al Qaeda:
The Destabilizing Legal Architecture of Counterterrorism, 111 MICH. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=21
38623.

22.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 120.
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And too then, after that, this concept of accountability. I think
that is one of the biggest problems, I think, for a lot of the people
over the past ten years is that even with so much that has been going
on, so much that might have been considered illegal or, at least,
should have been investigated as illegal, many people would argue,
the sense of accountability for overreach or accountability beyond, I
think, political accountability, but legal accountability, is that that’s
missing, that nobody has paid a legal accountability price for much of
the action that took place, including such things as torture. Do you
think this is partly a function of the presidential power to protect
other executive offices and that’s one of the reasons why or is there
simply more of a political ambition not a prosecutorial discretion not
to investigate?
PROF. GOLDSMITH: There’s a lot there. On the first question, when
the CIA went to the White House in late 2005 and said that it was
not going to continue with the interrogation program, it didn’t invoke
its discretion. It said that it had interpreted the law and concluded
that the program had become illegal and that as a result it wasn’t
going to continue. So, the CIA was interpreting the law and
disagreeing with the president, who had a different view. Think about
this in light of the debate about the unitary executive, which the
Bush Administration was supposedly committed to. 23 What the
unitary executive means in this context is that the president is the
chief law interpreter and can enforce that interpretation on
subordinates. But that’s not what happened here. Instead, a
subordinate national security agency said, “we’ve interpreted the law,
and we’re simply not going to do this anymore.” This is a remarkable
example of law being interpreted within the bureaucracy to put a stop
of a practice against the president’s wishes, not as a matter of
discretion, but as a matter of law.
Your accountability question is a hard one. I talk about this a lot
in my book. 24 Accountability is a broad term and I think many people
too often assume that criminal law accountability is the only form of
accountability. It is true that there have been few criminal
prosecutions arising out of the CIA program. But accountability is a
broader concept. It occurs whenever an actor is subject to account by
another institution that has the power to punish it or in some way
alter its behavior. By this broader definition, the CIA program has
been subject to extraordinary accountability unlike anything in our
nation’s history. There have been scores of investigations of the CIA

23.

See STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY
EXECUTIVE 3–36 (2008).

24.

See, e.g., GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 233–43.
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program, some still ongoing. 25 Those investigations have imposed real
costs on lots of people, causing them to lose their jobs, to suffer
financially, and to have their reputations dimmed and in some cases
ruined. In addition, these activities were subject to two separate
criminal investigations across two administrations. In the Obama
Administration, John Durham spent years turning the program upside
down, and he concluded that he did not have the evidence adequate
to bring a successful prosecution. 26
Durham was investigating people who acted outside their
authorizations by top Bush officials. I think there was an element of
political calculus by President Obama in not being more aggressive in
trying to bring criminal actions against the Bush Administration
officials who gave the authorizations. The president and his
subordinates are supposed to take into account community concerns,
broadly conceived, in deciding whether to prosecute. I think he
considered several factors in declining to do more in this context. Any
attempted prosecution of a Bush Administration official for something
that happened early in the war on terrorism would have been
enormously controversial. It would have been very difficult, under any
circumstances, to get a conviction, assuming that there was a criminal
violation. And so an attempted prosecution might have been selfdefeating because it might have alleviated some of the stigma that
now attaches to the early interrogation program. And of course,
because of the controversy that would have surrounded an attempted
prosecution, everything else the president was trying to accomplish
would have been jeopardized.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 2: My name is Ben Davis, University of Toledo.
My question is the following: To the extent that people know that we
tortured, as said in a recent report, yesterday, again, Libyans saying
they were waterboarded in Afghanistan, 27 to the extent that most
Americans feel that they were lied into the war in Iraq, how is it that
in this consensus that it was the inability of the system, of this group
that forms our national security strategy, or national security group,
to get or be made to bear some kind of accountability for the
enormous things that some people call crimes, like lying us into war
or torture in our system. And I understand overseas, how the
accountability affects things going on overseas. I understand there is
an investigation going on in the European Court of Human Rights, on
25.

Id. at 108–12.

26.

See Scott Shane, No Charges Filed on Harsh Tactics Used by the
C.I.A., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2012, at A1.

27.

See Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Libyan Alleges Waterboarding by
C.I.A. in Afghanistan, Rights Group Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at
A9.
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what happened in the CIA black site in Poland and those proxy sites
that are having their authorities looking at the things they did for us
and deciding on prosecution for the things that we did. 28
PROF. GOLDSMITH: I don’t think I have much more of an answer than
the one I just gave. I do think that there has been extraordinary
accountability in terms of unprecedented scrutiny and various forms
of non-criminal punishment, as I described. So I disagree with you on
your claim that there hasn’t been a lot of accountability. And I think
criminal prosecution, for reasons just stated, was simply infeasible. I
don’t claim, by the way, that there has been adequate accountability.
My aim in the book is simply to rebut the claim that there has not
been accountability. But whether there has been too much or too
little is a very difficult normative question. 29 To determine whether
there’s been adequate accountability you have to consider all the
systemic effects of accountability that you’re talking about, including
the systemic effects on national security, the systemic effects on
everything else that the government is trying to accomplish. I think
that any attempted criminal prosecution of top Bush officials would
have blown up in President Obama’s face and failed, and President
Obama realized this. I also think that an attempted prosecution
might have watered down the disapprobation or taboo that today
attaches to certain interrogation practices. I think President Obama
took all these considerations into account in deciding to do what he
did.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 3: I agree with your thesis that there has been
significant overlap in continuities between President Obama and
President Bush with regard to national security but I think there are
significant differences in regard to foreign affairs. I was wondering if
you would speak to that. For example, I think that the Bush
Administration took a much more unilateral approach to decision
making. They were far more able to launch what some people call
illegal wars in Iraq.
The Obama Administration, by contrast, had been far more
willing to extend a helping hand to Iran. He used military force far
more parsimoniously. There has been a strategic pivot away from the
Middle East towards Asia. There has been a less striped tone with the
Muslim world. So, I’m wondering, conceding that there’s been

28.

See Christian Lowe & Pawel Sobczak, Poland Provides Answers for CIA
Prisons Probe, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/09/05/oukwd-uk-poland-usa-renditionidAFBRE88415V20120905.

29.

See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 233–43.
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significant overlap in continuity with national security, where do you
think your thesis will also hold?
PROF. GOLDSMITH: As I said at the outset, my expertise is not in
pure foreign policy and I wouldn’t deny that President Obama has a
different foreign policy than former President Bush, although, a lot of
people have written about the remarkable similarities about how a lot
of the things that President Obama started set out to do ended up
looking a lot more of what President Bush might have done.
But I do want to take issue with one ironic claim you made about
the unilateral approach to decision making in war. When President
Bush went to war, he got congressional authorization, both in
September 2001 and in October 2002. President Obama, by contrast,
did not get congressional authorization for the Libya invasion and he
is in my opinion the first president to overtly violate the War Powers
Resolution.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: Jack, great presentation; great book. I did
want to congratulate you. An interesting issue. The new book, No
Easy Day, 30 has come out in which a Navy SEALl says that they went
after bin Laden, one of them popped him in the head with a rifle
round, they slowly crept up into the room. They looked in. They
found him lying in the door in the throws of death, quivering,
trembling, something like that. No sign he was a threat and then they
pumped several more rounds into his body.
This leads to an issue that has haunted me but maybe it’s
ignorance. Could it be said that this administration has taken the
stance that since you can’t interrogate them in a method that’s likely
to get useful information and word has gotten out, we really don’t
need any prisoners, and it’s better to shoot them a couple more times
than to have to feed and house them and worry about the lawyers?
PROF. GOLDSMITH: Good question, Bob. I haven’t read the book.
AUDIENCE MEMBER 4: Maybe a war crime?
PROF. GOLDSMITH: It might be, the way you described it. But let me
just answer the question on a little more abstract level. You implicitly
raise the question whether the Obama Administration has substituted
targeted killing for detention and interrogation. The rise of targeted
killing and the decline of detention and interrogation was actually a
trend that began in the last two years of the Bush Administration.
The Obama Administration continued this trend, relying much more

30.

MARK OWEN & KEVIN MAURER, NO EASY DAY (2012).
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heavily on targeted killing strikes and less on detention and
interrogation.
This raises the question about whether one is a substitute for the
other. I’ve talked to a lot of people in the administration about this
and here’s what I can tell you. Everyone at the top of the
administration fervently denies that there’s any overt policy of
tradeoff. I think that is right. But there are many people lower down
who say that interrogation and detention became so fraught, legally
and politically, that when it’s lawful to kill, that that option simply is
a more readily available option for dealing with the enemy. And I
think the tradeoff is inevitable. If you make one tool for
incapacitating the enemy less available, you’re going to use the other
tool. I do think that’s what happened. I have no idea if it’s happened
in the Bin Laden context, but I do think it‘s happened, in general.
Thank you, very much.
PROF. SCHARF: Thank you, again, Jack for a fantastic keynote for
this conference. His book, which I’m holding up is really a great read.
Buy it from Amazon and put it on your Kindle.
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